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ABSTRACT
There are two possible reasons for unionized workers to have lower
quit rates than otherwise comparable nonunion workers: unions could
organize employees with innately lower propensities to quit or they could
reduce propensities by offering disgruntled workers alternatives to
quitting in the form of grievance arbitration and related industrial
jurisprudence systems. This paper uses a fixed effect logit model based
on the conditional likelihood function to disentangle these two effects.
The paper finds that the observed union—quit tradeoff is due largely
to the impact of unionism on worker behavior rather than to the propensity
of stable workers to be organized, supporting the notion that unions have
important nonwage effects along the lines suggested by the "exit—voice"
model of union activity.
Richard B. Freeman




(617) 868—3915With wages and other characteristics hold fixed, unionized workers
have been found to have significantly lower quit and permanent separation
rates and greater job tenure than nonunion workers) Why?
There are two possible explanations for the observed inverse relation
between unionism and quit or exit behavior. One possibility is that the
trade union institution reduces the propensity to leave an enterprise by
providing disgruntled workers with alternatives to quitting such as
grievance/arbitration and regular contract negotiations, and by providing
especially desirable nonwage work conditions. Another very different
possibility is that the union—quit relation reflects selectivity in
union membership, with organized employees differing from nonorganized
workers in unobserved characteristics that lead to lower quit rates.
Whether the inverse relation between unionism and exit is due to the effect
of unionism on behavior or to selectivity is central to understanding
the "exit—voice trade6ff" in the labor market and what unions do in an
industrial economy.
This paper seeks to disentangle the two possible causes of the lower
quit rate2 of union workers using G. Chamberlaints fixed effect logit
model that is based on the conditional likelihood function. The fixed
effect logit eliminates selectivity bias by comparing the likelihood
of quitting by the same worker in union and nonunionsettings, thereby
isolating the behavioral impact of the institution. Maximizing the
likelihood function conditional on the number of quits has desirable
asymptotic and computational properties that make the model a valuable
research tool.
The paper finds that the observedunion—quit tradeoff is due largely
to the impact of unionism on worker behaviorrather than to the propensity
of stable workers to be organized,supporting the notion that unions have
important nonwage effects along the linessuggested by the "exit—voice"
model of union activity.32
The paper is divided into four sections. The first sets out the
reasonsfor expecting unionism to reduce quits. The second describes the
methodology of the empirical analyses. The thirdpresents the empirical
results. The paper concludes with a brief evaluation of the economic
consequences of the union—induced decrease in exit and of the implications
for further analysis of trade unionism.
I. Unionism and Exit Behavior
With wages and other measured characteristics of workers held fixed,
the quit propensities of union and nonunion employees can be expected
to differ for two basic types of reasons.
First, unionism is likely to reduce quits through its functioning
as a "voice" institution that offers workers a substitute mode of
protesting and potentially changing work conditions to classical exit
behavior. Perhaps the most important aspect of unionism likely to have
significant effects on quit behavior is the ievance/arbitration system,
which enables workers who feel themselves unfairly treated or who believe
their supervisors erred in interpreting work rules to seek a resolution
through the formal grievance procedure. Ninety—nine percent of major U.S.
collective bargaining contracts contain grievance clauses and 95% contain
arbitration clauses (U.S. Department of Labor, 1977, p. 92), while by
contrast, in the nonunion sector, at most 30% of large firms have formal
grievance procedures and only 11% allow for outside arbitration
(Bureau of National Affairs, 1968, p. 2). The likely impact of a grievance
system on quits is clear: disgruntled workers will generally raise a
grievance before invoking the more drastic quit remedy; if successful they
will stay with the firm;evenif unsuccessful the delay in quits will reduce3
theoverall level of exit.4 The regular process of collective bargaining
can also be expected to reduce exit by providing the possibility of changing
contractual arrangements through negotiation rather than mobility. If,
as seems reasonable, unions are especially effective in altering conditions
and rules that are 'public' to the enterprise, where standard public
goods arguments suggest that considerable mobility would be needed for
firms to obtain information about preferences, the bargaining process
might substantively reduce the quits needed for provision of the desired
conditions. Finally, unionism may reduce exit by creating particular work
rules and conditions of employment that are desired by workers, including
the industrial jurisprudence method of setting rules. If, with pay and
other pecuniary benefits held fixed, union work places are more desirable
to employees, compensating differential analysis suggests that unionists
will quit less.
The second possible reason for the observed reduction in quits under
unionism is that unions tend to organize workers with lower quit propensities.
Such selectivity is to be expected if unionism can be viewed as an investment
with longterin returns, which will attract relatively stable workers
likely to be more willing to invest in organizing than are short—term
workers, especially given the long delays in obtaining NLRB representation
elections in recent years. The selectivity effect differs fundamentally
from the behavioral effect in that it implies that unions have no real
impact on behavior but merely serve to sort out more and less stable
workers. Since the reduction In exit under unionism has been .heralded
as one of the major nonwage effects of the institution, with considerable
cost—saving advantages due to the cost of turnover, it is important to
control for the potential impact of selectivity bias on the results.4
II.The Econometric Model
Longitudinal data on the quit behavior of the same person over time
provides a means of differentiating between the effects of unionism as an
institution that influences behavior and of selectivity in the union—exit
relation. The use of longitudinal data to control for unobservedpersonal
factors can be most readily demonstrated with a linear probability model.
Let 0—1 dummy variable which measures whether the ithperson quits
inperiod t; UN1=0—1dummy variable for whether or not the person is
aunion member, h.unobserved personal characteristics which raises the
propensity to quit; and be a residual uncorrelated with unionism.
For simplicity, the effect of other variables will be Ignored, implying
that the coefficients and error terms are partial with respect to other
variables. Then, the linear probability representation of the quit decision
is:
(1)Q.= —aUN.+ h. + e. it it 1 it
If E(h. UN.)0,the regression of Nit will yield a biased
estimate of a. When, as seems reasonable, union workers are innately more
stable, E(UN.h.) <0so that the bias is downward, the effect of unionism
onquits will be overstated. With data on several time periods, however, the
effect of h1 can be eliminated by including individualcon-
stants in the regressions. In the linear model this Is equivalent to taking
deviations from means for all the variables. With data on two periods, the





Since the h1 terms have been eliminated from (2), there is no problem
in estimating a by least squares.5
As is well—known, however, the linear probability model is not entirely
appropriate: it fails to bound the probabilities between 0 and 1 and has
non—normal error terms. A widely used alternative is the logistic,






wheredP/dUN.<0.The logistic is bounded between 0 and 1 and can be
estimatedby maximumlikelihood. When the model is expanded to include
fixed person effects, however, the resultant estimates are not consistent,
essentially because the number of individual parameters estimated in
the nonlinear form rises as the sample increases, so that increasing
the sample size does not produce desired asymptotic properties. While
additional time periods on an Individual will yield consistent estimates,
standard data sets provide only limited longitudinal information,
generally on large numbers of persons.
Chamberlain's fixed effects logit model provides an alternative pro-
cedure using a conditional likelihood function. The basic idea is that the
number of quits provides a sufficient statistic for the omitted person
factor h1.5 Holding fixed the number of quits, hi drops from the likelihood
function, producing a nonlinear relation comparable to the linear robabilitv
fixed effects model. Since people who quit in every period or who never
quit provide no information about the effect of unionism or other explanatory
variables, the analysis focuses on persons who quit in one (or more)
periods and who stay on a job for one (or more) periods. In the case of
two periods, there are two possibilities: quit in period 1 EQ1 =1and
Q2= 0] or quit in period 2 [Q1 =0and Q2 =1].The conditional probability
for the event 10 (i.e. Q1 =1and Q20) is:6
(4) P1(l.-P2)_____
P2(1—P1)
where P1 =logisticprobability for quitting in period 1 and P2logistic
probability for quitting in period 2. Substituting for the P's with the
logistic (3) yields
exp[a(UN12 —UN11)]
(5)Prob(l0) = 1+ exp[a(UN.2 —
UN11)]
from which the h. has been eliminated. Since there are only twoevents
(10) and (01), this is a simple binary logit with explanatory variables
in differenceform, for which consistent estimates of a can be obtained
using standard maximum likelihood packages.
The way in which the conditional logit model provides information on
the effects of unionism on the quit behavior of individuals can be
readily ascertained from (5). For a person who switches, say, from
union status in period 1 to nonunion status in period 2, the explanatory
variable UN. —UN. takes on the value —1. This implies that the i2 ii
probability of the event quit/no quit is increased——a sensible pattern
if unionism reduces the probability of quitting, since thenmoving from union
to nonunion, status should lower the conditional probability ofquitting in the
first period relative to the second period.
When thereare more than 2 periods the Chamberlain fixed effect
logityields a multinomial model, with several possible outcomes.
In the case of 3 periods, for example, there are six cases (001, 010, 100,
101, 011 and 110). This model can be estimated with standard inultinomial
packages. The Manski—McFadden conditional logitprogram provides an
especiallyuseful package for estimation, as itpermits simultaneous
estimationof the effect of variables conditional onone, two, three, or
morequits.The consistency of the estimates in the fixed effects logit and the
properties of the information matrix are discussed in detail by Chamberlain.
What is important for our purposes is that the model provides the appropriate
statistical tool for dealing with the unobserved personal factor h1
in the union quit problem.
III. Empirical Results
The effect of unionism on quit behavior using fixed effects models
has been estimated with longitudinal data for the period 1968—72 from the
MichiganPanel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID).Records on the Michigan
tapewereorganized into a file giving wages and other characteristics of
workers and unionism in a given year and quits in the ensuing year. Persons
who left the labor force were excluded from the sample in order to focus
on quits involving changes inemployers as opposed to retirement or other
movements out of the labor market. There were 4058 persons in the five
year sample with information on 20,290 quit/no quit decisions.
As a first step in evaluating the effect of unionism on quit behavior
and the importance of unobserved person factors, a linear probability model
was estimated treating each of the 20,290 decisions as a separate dependent
observation. The results of the linear analysis are given in table 1.
Column 1gives the mean and standarddeviation of the key variables.
Column2records the results of regressing the 0—1 dummy variablefor a quit
on unionism, hourly wages.and year dummies, while column 3 adds various
othercontrol variables, such as education, age, and occupation. Column 4
replaces the control variables with individual constants to control for the
omittedperson factor h1.
Thecalculations reveal a sizeable inverse union—quit relation, which
is not seriously affected by the omitted person factor. In the firstregression,
the coefficient on unionism is —.029, with a standard error of .004,8
Table 1: Linear Probability Model Estimates of the Effect
of Unionism and Wages on Quit Behavior
mean &
standard deviation CoefficientandStandard Error






Hourly Wages 3.40(2.50) —.006(.0008)—.005(.0009) —.002(.0Ol)
Individual Constants
Other Controls













S.E.E. .275 .272 .263
F 23.5 26.3 i.,5
N 20290 20290 20290
Source:Clculatcd from ician ?anci Survey on Income Pynamico
Note: The SEE and F in column 4 relate to the full equation, adjusted for the
degrees of freedom due to the individual constants. The F for the additionof
the explanatory variables is 8.2.9
implying that trade unionism is associated with a quit rate 35% belowthe
average. The coefficient on wages is also highly significantnegative
but of more modest magnitude: to reduce quitsby 35% would require a wage
increase of $4.83 or142% above theaverage. Addition of diverse person,
job, and area characteristics to the regression in column (2) modifies
these findings modestly, raising the absolute value of theunion coefficient
and reducing that of the coefficient onwages. The impact of unionism is
increased by addition of controls because organized workersare concentrated
in blue collar occupations, where quit rates tend to beexpecially high.
When individual constants are added to theregression
(coinputationany, by taking each variable as deviation from itsmean value),
the. coefficient on the union variable is—. 029, which is identical
to that in the first regression, while the
coefficient on hourly wages declines
in magnitude. The continued effect ofunionism with the individual
constants implies that in the linear model, at least, the bulk ofthe
union effect is not the result of unions selectingmore stable workers but
rather of unions reducing the likelihood of quitsby individual workers.
Table 2 turns to Chamberlain's fixed effectslogit model, concentra.—
ing on the union and wage variables. Sincepersons who remained in their
job over the whole period or who quit in each periodare eliminated, the
sample drops to 1232, consisting of 877 cases of a singlequit, 276 cases
of 2 quits, 67 cases of 3 quits, and 12cases of 4 quits. Columns 1 and 2
record the estimated logistic parameter coefficientson unionism and wages
in calculations which first exclude and then includethe same set of controls
used in the previous table. Without the controls theprobability of a quit in
the sample is significantly reduced by tradeunionism, with a logistic parameter
'of —.39. At the mean level ofquits in the sample this implies a drop in10
Table 2: Logistic Probability Model Estimates of the
Effects of Unionism and Wages on Quit Behavior
Coefficient and Standard Error
Lpglstic_Model — FixedEffect Logit
Ignoring Person Single & Multiple
Effects Single Quits Quits
Independert Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unionism —.386(.065) —.464(.070)—.378(.174) —.4E2(.15l)
Hourly Wage1 —.lll(.014) —.105(.019)—.032(.116) .128(.104)
Individual Constant I /
OtherControls











Constant / / / I
SummaryStatistics
N 20290 20290 877 1232
1iourly wage taken relative to the average in a year to allow for changes in wages over time.11
the probability of quitting of .029 points due to unionism, identical to
the value obtained from the linear model. Consistent with
the preceding results, moreover, addition of the control raises the impact
of unionism noticeably. Columns 3 and 4 give maximum likelihood est:iinates
f the fixed effect conditional logit model. In 3 the calculations are
conditional on a single quit while in 4 multiple quits are also taken into
account. As with the linear probability calculations, the results are
clear cut: the trade union effect is only modestly affected by correcting
for the omitted person factor while by contrast, the coefficient on wages
is significantly reduced by the correction. The differential effect of the
individual constants on the union and wage coefficients may reflect the
fact that wages are more person related than unionism, which is much more
of a social phenomenon. As far as can be told by these calculations, the
reduction of quits associated with unionism is due largely to the effect of
the institution on individual behavior rather than union selectivity of
persons with initially low quit propensities.
IV. Conclusion
This study has used the Chamberlain fixed effect logit model to
eliminate unobserved person factors from the union quit equation. It has
found thatmostof the observed union—exit tradeoff is due to the impact of
the institution on quit decisions, as opposed to selectivity of more
stable workers and thus lends general support to the view that trade
unionism has significant nonwage effects on the behavior of workers,
roughly in accord with the "exit—voice" model of unionism. Since
reductions in quits lower turnover costs and raise the payoff to investments
in specific human capital, the impact of unionism on quit behavior should
raise productivity, contributing to the observed positive effect of unions on12
productivityin some sectors (Brown—Medoff). In thiscase
atleast the impact of unionism does notmasque an omitted selectivity
factor but rather appears to reflect a true socialeffect.13
Footnotes
'See Freeman, Brown—Medoff,Viscusi, Kahn, among others.
2While thepaper concentrates on the quit rate, the analysis could
easily be extended to total separations. Unionism appears to lower
quits but to have little impact on other permanent separations, so that
the quit relation captures the principal impact of the institution.
3Fordiscussion of the "exit—voice" approach see Hirschman, Freeman,
Nelson, }lirschman(1976)and Freeman and Medoff.
4There are two conditions for the delay effect tooperate. First, there
mustbe some nonzero probability of redressing the grievance, so thatthe
workeris willing to try the option. Second, the length of employment
must be finite, for otherwise delays will not affect the steady state
solution. If, on average, the length of employment were initially, say
10 years, then a delay in quitting for, say 1/2 year, would reduce the
quit rate from 10% to about 9 1/2%, a non—negligible though by no means
large effect.
5See Chamberlain,pp. 8—14. The basic idea is that the person effect
predisposes an individual to quit a certain number of times but does not
affect the timing of quits. The explanatory variables affect the timing.
obtain (5), substitute for P1 and P2 to get
exp—aUN exp—aUN exp—aUN
1+ exp—aUN21+
exp—aUN1 1 + exp—aUN21 +
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